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INTRODUCTION 
“Is this time different?” is the question that 
economists and experts worryingly argue over 
when they analyze the socio-economic impact 
of the AI revolution as compared with the 
other industrial revolutions of the 19th and 20th 
centuries. This Schumpeterian wave may prove 
to be a creative destruction raising incomes, 
enhancing quality of life for all and generating 
previously unimagined jobs to replace those 
that get automatized. Or it may turn out to 
be a destructive creation leading to mass 
unemployment, hollowing out of the middle 
class, and to abuses or loss of control over key 
decision-making processes. This depends on 
the velocity and magnitude of the development 
and diffusion of AI technologies, a point over 
which experts diverge widely.  But technology 
is certainly not destiny and policy as well as 
institutional choices will matter greatly. 
According to our analysis, making the 
AI revolution work for everyone will 
require systemic reforms, and the 
potential reinvention of social security, 
redistribution mechanisms, as well 
as education and skill development 
systems, to allow for repeated and 
viable professional transitions. Policy 
and regulatory frameworks will also 
need rebalancing to protect the most 
vulnerable from socio-economic 
exclusion, to prevent algorithmic 
discrimination and privacy abuses, to 
ensure control and accountability, as well 
as to avoid an exacerbation of wealth and 
opportunity inequalities.
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Will we succeed in making 
the AI revolution work for everyone? 
A. ADAPTING SOCIAL SECURITY 
AND REDISTRIBUTIVE MECHANISMS
CREATIVE DESTRUCTION OR DESTRUCTIVE CREATION?
The most discussed set of policy challenges associated with the rise 
of AI refers to the impact of automation on jobs and inequalities, with 
some scholars positing the potential “hollowing out” of the middle 
classes. Experts agree that the automation wave fueled by AI will 
profoundly impact employment patterns and business processes. 
How is this time different from previous waves of technological 
disruption? Whether this “Schumpeterian wave” proves to be a 
creative destruction like those that have come before—resulting 
in higher average incomes and generating previously unimagined 
jobs to replace those that get automatized—or turns out to be a 
destructive creation, leading to mass unemployment, depends on 
the velocity of the development and diffusion of AI technologies 
over the coming decade. Here, there is significant uncertainty 
amongst scholars.
Along with President Obama’s former Council of Economic Advisers 
Chairman, Jason Furman’s, paper published in July 20161, and 
the White House report on Artificial Intelligence, Automation 
and the Economy published in December 20162, the McKinsey 
Global Institute report on Harnessing Automation for a Future that 
Works3, released in January 2017, concluded that the fundamental 
shifts in the labor force caused by automation technologies would 
be “of a scale not without precedent.”. In their 2014 book entitled 
The Second Machine Age, Eric Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee 
had on their part argued that we are facing an unprecedented 
1  Jason Furman, “Is this time different? The opportunities and challenges of artifi cial intelligence,” 
remarks at AI Now: The Social and Economic Implications of Artifi cial Intelligence Technologies in 
the Near Term , conference in New York, July 7, 2016.
2  Artifi cial intelligence, automation, and the economy, Executive Offi ce of the President, December 
2016. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/12/20/artifi cial-intelligence-
automation-and-economy 
3  James Manyika, Michael Chui, Mehdi Miremadi, Jacques Bughin, Katy George, Paul Willmott, and 
Martin Dewhurst, Harnessing Automation for a Future that Works, McKinsey Global Institute, 
January 2017 (p.97).
inflection point between the first machine age, 
based on the automation of physical tasks through 
mechanization, and a second machine age, based 
on the automation of cognitive tasks through 
digital technologies4.
Results of studies on the impact of job automation 
conducted over the past five years have differed 
quite radically in their assessment and projections: 
a report from the OECD published in June 20165 
– focused on its 21 Member countries and centered 
around “tasks” as a unit of analysis – concluded 
that a modest average of 9 percent of tasks are 
automatable. There are predicted to be notable 
differences between different countries’ trends6. 
The 2013 study of Frey and Osborne on the future 
of employment,7 which focused on the broader 
concept of “occupations,” had raised alarm 
bells with its conclusion that about 47 percent of 
jobs in the U.S. were susceptible to automation 
over the next two decades. Another report by 
Citibank,8 building on the Frey and Osborne study 
as well as on data from the World Bank, focused 
on 50 countries and concluded that, on average 
in OECD countries, 50 percent of the jobs were 
susceptible to automation. This number was 
particularly high in India (69% susceptibility) and 
China (77% susceptibility). Analyzing more than 
2,000 work activities across 800 occupations, 
McKinsey’s most recent report concluded that 
“about half the activities people are paid almost 
$15 trillion in wages to do in the global economy 
4  Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, The second machine age: Work, 
progress, and prosperity in a time of brilliant technologies, W. W. 
Norton & Company, 2014.
5  Melanie Arntz, Terry Gregory, and Ulrich Zierahn, The risk of 
automation for jobs in OECD countries: A comparative analysis, OECD 
Social, Employment and Migration working paper number 189, OECD, 
May 2016
6 For instance the share of automatable jobs is 6% in Korea vs. 12% in 
Austria.
7  Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael A. Osborne, The future of employment: 
How susceptible are jobs to computerisation?, Oxford Martin School, 
September 17, 2013.
8  Technology at Work v2.0: The future is not what it used to be, Citibank, 
January 2016.
“OUR ANALYSIS OF THE MOST RECENT 
LITERATURE POINTS TO THE LIKELY NEED 
FOR PROGRESSIVE TAX POLICIES TO 
REBALANCE THE LABOR TO CAPITAL SHIFT 
THAT IS LIKELY TO BE SEEN IN THE AI 
REVOLUTION, IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE 
MOST VULNERABLE FROM SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
EXCLUSION, AS WELL AS TO AVOID AN 




have the potential to be automated. […]. While less 
than 5 percent of all occupations can be automated 
entirely, about 60 percent of all occupations have at 
least 30 percent of constituent. More occupations 
will change than will be automated away.”9 The 
report also concluded that activities most exposed 
include “physical activities in highly structured and 
predictable environments, as well as the collection 
and processing of data.” 
Moving for ward, it  is paramount that more 
re s e a rc h is  c o n d u c te d to  u n d e r s t a n d th e 
factors of job automation at more a granular 
level, in particular across timeframes, sectors, 
wage levels, education levels, job types, and 
locations. Reports have hitherto mainly pointed 
to a continuation, if not an accentuation,10 of the 
skill-biased displacement trend,11 mitigated by 
the ability of AI and automation technologies to 
replace high-skill cognitive tasks which exhibit 
9  Harnessing Automation for a Future that Works, McKinsey Global 
Institute, January 2017 (p. vi). MGI scenarios suggest that half of 
today’s work activities could be automated by 2055 or 20 years earlier 
or later depending on the various factors, in addition to other wider 
economic conditions.
10  It’s what Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee have called “super-
star biased technological change” in their book The Second Machine 
Age. “It’s the fact that technologies can leverage and amplify the 
special talents, skill, or luck of the 1% or maybe even the 100th of 
1% and replicate them across millions or billions of people. In those 
kinds of markets, you tend to have winner-take-all outcomes and a 
few people reap enormous benefi ts and all of us as consumers reap 
benefi ts as well, but there’s a lot less need for people of just average 
or above-average skills”. http://www.businessinsider.com/erik-
brynjolfsson-2014-1 
11  For instance, the OECD 2016 study estimates that 44 percent of 
American workers with less than a high school degree hold jobs made up 
of highly-automatable tasks while 1 percent of people with a bachelor’s 
degree or higher hold such a job. Melanie Arntz, Terry Gregory, and 
Ulrich Zierahn, The risk of automation for jobs in OECD countries: A 
comparative analysis. Ibid. See also Artifi cial intelligence, automation, 
and the economy, Executive Offi ce of the President (p. 13 and 14)
high degree of routine.12 Some low-skilled tasks requiring advanced 
hand-dexterity will also remain in demand, at least in the short term. 
Studies have also highlighted the loss of jobs for some workers 
in the short-run, but to a substantial degree the time-frame of 
displacement depends on institution-specifi c policy responses.
POLICY MATTERS: MAKING THE AI REVOLUTION WORK 
FOR EVERYONE
Societies’ ability to shape the AI revolution into a creative destruction 
and diffuse its benefi t to all mainly depends on how they collectively 
react to it. Technology is certainly not destiny, and policy as well as 
institutional choices will matter greatly. Our analysis of the most 
recent literature points to the likely need for progressive tax policies 
to rebalance the labor to capital shift that is likely to be seen in the 
AI revolution, in order to protect the most vulnerable from socio-
economic exclusion, as well as to avoid an explosion in inequalities of 
wealth and opportunities. We believe, however that “taxing robots” 
per se13 may not be the best option, and could be counterproductive 
if implemented narrowly, potentially slowing growth and triggering 
legal challenges.
Systemic policy responses will be required, including reform, and 
potential reinvention of, Social Security and redistributive tax. 
Education and skill development systems will also need reforming 
to enable for repeated and viable professional transitions. Given the 
diffi culty in predicting areas of greater impact and to disaggregate 
AI-driven automation from other factors (e.g. other technological 
changes, globalization, reduction in market competition, workers’ 
bargaining power, past public policy choices), policy responses will 
initially have to target the whole economy, until targeted strategies 
become more effective, and monitoring and evaluation practices 
have been designed.
12  Harnessing Automation for a Future that Works, McKinsey Global Institute, Ibid. Also see 
Artifi cial intelligence, automation, and the economy, White House Report. Ibid. (page 23). 
13  In a very recent interview Bill Gates advocated for it as a way to slow down the pace of 




As large swathes of the workforce will be exposed to significant 
insecurity in the anticipated transition, the reform and enhancement 
of safety nets has often been suggested as a priority. However, raising 
minimum wages might paradoxically accelerate automation trends, 
if used indiscriminately. The opportunity to provide a Universal 
Basic Income (UBI)—in essence providing a regular, unconditional 
cash grant—which would revamp social welfare programs in a 
“post-secure-wage society” driven by automation, is now a feature 
of political agendas on the Left14 and on the Right.15, of course with 
different contours and degrees.
Economists are archly divided on the matter. Proponents, including 
Thomas Piketty,16 see UBI as a way of simplifying the current 
bureaucratic system, and making it more efficient and fair. UBI 
is seen as a solution to address the looming automation wave, 
by favoring work as opposed to unemployment, which has been 
demonstrated to favor dangerous spirals of marginalization. 
Attacking mainly the “unconditionality” criteria, opponents17 
denounce an excessively radical and unrealistic approach to 
reforming existing safety nets. They argue that unconditionality 
could be counter-productive, resulting in increased, not decreased, 
income inequality. This camp also argues that UBI could potentially 
de-incentivize work which they also see as a pillar of social 
integration.
Interestingly, Finland recently announced a UBI experiment this 
year,18 which should provide valuable evidence to move the debate 
14  In the recent French Socialist Party primary elections held in January 2017, the large victory of 
Benoit Hamon has essentially been credited to his ability to bring the progressive deployment of 
a universal basic income as a his fl agship measure. See also Andy Stern and Lee Kravitz, Raising 
the Floor: How a Universal Basic Income Can Renew Our Economy and Rebuild the American 
Dream, June 2016.
15  Charles Murray, “A guaranteed income for every American”, WSJ, June 2016. https://www.wsj.
com/articles/a-guaranteed-income-for-every-american-1464969586 ; See also Matt Zwolinsky, 
« The Libertarian Case for Basic Income », December 2013. https://www.libertarianism.org/
columns/libertarian-case-basic-income 
16  Provided UBI targets low wages. See « Pour un revenu universel crédible et audacieux », Le 
Monde, 25 Janvier 2017. http://piketty.blog.lemonde.fr/2017/01/25/pour-un-revenu-universel-
credible-et-ambitieux/ 
17  Jason Furman, “Is this time different? The opportunities and challenges of artifi cial intelligence,” 
remarks at AI Now: The Social and Economic Implications of Artifi cial Intelligence Technologies 
in the Near Term, conference in New York, July 7, 2016.
18  in which 2,000 unemployed people between the ages of 25 and 58 will receive a guaranteed 
sum – a “basic income” – of €560 a month for two years whether or not they fi nd work. See 
Sonia Soda, “Is Finland’s basic universal income a solution to automation, fewer jobs and lower 
wages?”, Guardian, February 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/feb/19/basic-
income-fi nland-low-wages-fewer-jobs?CMP=share_btn_tw 
forward. An experiment is also on the cards 
in the Netherlands though, interestingly, the 
mention of “universal income” has recently been 
abandoned19. In a 2016 referendum, Switzerland 
rejected, with a 77 percent majority, plans to 
deploy a monthly $2,555 universal income for 
all adults.20
Besides the UBI, a large variety of more moderate 
policy options are also on the table. These 
include strategies to tighten labor markets and 
pressure wages upward; and the possibility of 
strengthening workers’ collective bargaining 
power, thus creating new and innovative ways 
to make workers’ voices hear. Such policies aim 
to rebalance AI-driven concentration, which it is 
argued could lead to a monopolistic or oligopolistic 
market. Other available policy options seek a shift 
in scale rather than in nature of existing societal 
safety nets. They include the strengthening of 
existing unemployment insurance schemes to be 
more targeted or attuned to local environments, 
or to have their boundaries extended to include, 
for instance, people who decide on their own to 
quit their job21 to pursue training or transition to 
entrepreneurship. Work-based reform options 
also include modernizing overtime, employment 
c o n t r a c t s ,  w i t h  w o r k- s h a r i n g  p r o g r a m s 
and temporar y work-based tra in ing being 
encouraged22.
Final ly,  to make the AI revolution work for 
everyone, policy-responses will have to find 
innovative ways to ensure that a more mobile and 
insecure workforce has fair access to credit as 
well as healthcare and retirement benefi ts. Such 
benefits have been hitherto largely dependent 
on employers’ contributions, either directly or 
indirectly – with limited portability when people 
seek professional transitions, or choose to adapt 
their employment contracts (e.g. including part-
time jobs and entrepreneurship). Challenges 
to existing employment practices will involve 
systemic policy change.
19  Deployed in 20 Dutch municipalities, the experiment will allow small 
groups of benefi t claimants to be paid $825 a month while continuing 
to earning what they make from work. See Daniel Boffey, “Dutch city 
plans to pay citizens a ‘basic income’, and Greens say it could work in 
the UK”, Guadian, December 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2015/dec/26/dutch-city-utrecht-basic-income-uk-greens 
20 See http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36454060 
21  That’s what French presidential candidate Emmanuel Macron 
has proposed for instance. See https://www.contrepoints.
org/2016/11/13/271472-macron-veut-autoriser-chomage-aux-
salaries-demissionnent 
22  A more detailed description can be found in the White House report 
Artifi cial intelligence, automation, and the economy, Executive Offi ce 
of the President. Ibid. (p. 34-40).
“BESIDES THE UBI, A LARGE VARIETY OF MORE 
MODERATE POLICY OPTIONS ARE ALSO ON THE TABLE. 
THESE INCLUDE STRATEGIES TO TIGHTEN LABOR 
MARKETS AND PRESSURE WAGES UPWARD; AND 
THE POSSIBILITY OF STRENGTHENING WORKERS’ 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POWER. OTHER AVAILABLE 
POLICY OPTIONS INCLUDE THE STRENGTHENING OF 
EXISTING UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SCHEMES, 
MODERNIZING OVERTIME, EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS, 
ENCOURAGING WORK-SHARING PROGRAMS AND 
TEMPORARY WORK-BASED TRAINING.”
Will we succeed in making 
the AI revolution work for everyone? 
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B. THE CASE FOR 21ST CENTURY 
EDUCATION AND SKILL DEVELOPMENT 
SYSTEMS
REINVENTING ACTIVE LABOR MARKET PROGRAMS
As we have written above, the wave of automation 
caused by the AI revolution will displace a very 
large amount of jobs across domains and value 
chains.  The U.S. “automated vehicle” case 
study analyzed in the White House 2016 report 
on Artificial intelligence, Automation, and the 
Economy is emblematic of what’s at stake: 2.2 
to 3.1 million existing part- and full-time U.S. jobs 
are exposed23 over the next two decades, though 
the timeline remains uncertain. In particular, 
between1.3 and 1.7 million heavy truck drivers 
are threatened. And this is not trivial, for the 
profession has symbolized in the collective 
imaginary the manifestation of the American 
dream of empowerment, l iber t y and social 
ascension whereby less-educated people could 
make it into the middle class24.
The automation wave calls at least for higher 
investment and probably the need to reinvent 
active labor market programs in the coming 
decades25. Such investment should logically be 
funded by fi scal policies targeting the capital. The 
2016 White House report on Artifi cial intelligence, 
Automation, and the Economy gave an interesting 
order of magnitude applied to the case of the 
U.S.: “increasing funding for job training in the 
U.S. by six-fold—which would match spending as 
a percentage of GDP to Germany, but still leave 
the U.S. far behind other European countries—
would enable retraining of an additional 2.5 million 
people per year”26.
AI and other digital technologies of fer real 
potential to innovate new approaches to job-
s e a rc h  a s s i s t a n c e ,  p l a c e m e n t  a n d  h i r i n g 
processes in the age of personalized services. The 
efficiency of matching labor supply and demand 
can be tremendously enhanced by the rise of 
23  Though the fi gures exclude new types of jobs that may be developed in 
the industry. See Artifi cial intelligence, automation, and the economy, 
Executive Offi ce of the President. Ibid. (p. 15-17)
24  Sean Kilcarr, “Defi ning the American Dream for trucking ... and the 
nation, too”, Fleetowner, April 2017
25  OECD member countries outside of the U.S. spent, on average, 0.6 
percent of GDP on active labor market policies in 2014. The U.S. spent 
just 0.1 percent of GDP, less than half of what it did 30 years ago. 
OECD, “Labour market programmes: expenditure and participants”, 
OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics (database), 2016. 
http://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.aspx?datasetcode=LMPEXP&lang
=en# 
26  This assumes $6,000 per person training/reemployment cost, and an 
increase in Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act funding from 
today’s $3B to $18B, to match Germany’s spending as a fraction of 
GDP, with all new funding spent on training.  See Artifi cial intelligence, 
automation, and the economy, Executive Offi ce of the President. Ibid. 
(p. 33).
multi-sided platforms and predictive analytics. The case of platforms 
such as LinkedIn for instance with its 470 million registered users is 
interesting as an evolution in hiring practices. Tailored counseling 
and integrated re-training programs also represent promising 
grounds for innovation.
This, however, won’t be enough. A lot will have to be done to create 
fair and effective life-long skill development/training infrastructure 
and mechanisms capable of empowering millions of people to viably 
transition jobs, sectors and potentially geographies – that, too, 
several times in a lifetime. A lot will also have to be done to address 
differential geographic impacts which exacerbate income and 
wealth disparities. Effectively enabling the workforce to be more 
mobile –both physically, legally and virtually- will be crucial. And 
this implies of course systemic policy approaches which encompass 
housing, transportation, licensing, taxes and, crucially in the age of 
AI, broadband access -especially in rural areas.
To lay solid foundations for this profound transformation, we need 
more research in at least three complementary areas: fi rst, to devise 
mechanisms of dynamic mapping of tasks and occupations at risks 
of automation and associated employment volumes. This mapping of 
the workforce supply is needed at the macro but also crucially at the 
micro levels where labor market programs are deployed. Integrated 
with that, we also need more granular and dynamic mapping of the 
future jobs/tasks, workplace-structures, associated work-habits, 
and skill-base spurred by the AI revolution. This mapping of the 
demand side will be key to innovate, align and synchronize skill 
development and training programs with future requirements in 
anticipation, that too on the right timescales. And fi nally, we need 
more policy research on the dynamics of professional transitions in 
different labor market conditions.
To maximize intended impact, create necessary space for trial-and-
errors strategies, and to scale up solutions that work, we recommend 
implementing robust data-driven evidence-based approaches. 
These approaches should be based on experiments and centered 
on outcomes in terms of employment but also in terms of earnings. 
We also recommend exploring new forms of people-public-private 
partnerships involving civil society as well as new outcome-oriented 
financial mechanisms such as Social Impact Bonds for instance 
which could help scale up successful innovations.
A REVOLUTION IN EDUCATION?
Understanding components and drivers of AI-labor complementarity 
and navigating that evolving understanding nimbly to transform 
primary, secondary and professional education will be capital in 
the coming decades. Because of the large impact of the rise of AI 
on economies and societies, this implies of course for all countries - 
almost as a sovereignty imperative, the need to invest in developing 
AI-related workforce. It is needed to support advances in the fi eld 
of fundamental research, in the engineering, and of course in the 
applications, business and socio-political aspects. And the fi eld is by 
defi nition interdisciplinary with expanding confi nes towards biology, 
cognitive and brain science. Because of the central role of data in 
developing and training machine learning algorithms, boundaries 
between fundamental research, applied research, engineering 
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and higher education are likely to blur27. We are already seeing a 
trend whereby fundamental research in AI is shifting away from 
universities and government laboratories to the biggest technology 
companies. Academics worry about what they call a “brain drain”28 
which could damage the quality of public research and education 
down-the-line.
In the 2016 Economic Report of the President29, the White House 
summarized: “college- and career-ready skills in math, reading, 
computer science, and critical thinking are likely to be among 
the factors in helping workers successfully navigate through 
unpredictable changes in the future labor market”.
Basic literacy and math will more than ever represent the crucial 
foundation of employability, especially with the accentuation of skill-
based job displacement; as will be the quality of early-education since 
“catching up” will become more difficult; or the need to generalize 
access to secondary education which should include proven 
alternatives such as apprenticeship, creative and vocational training30. 
Diversifying and enhancing STEM curriculum beyond computer science 
to include computational thinking, data science, creativity, innovation 
and entrepreneurship also appears to be a required evolution.
27  The case of Yann LeCun is emblematic. A pioneer in machine learning, computer vision, mobile 
robotics and computational neuroscience with a long career in academia in France and in 
the U.S., he joined Facebook as Director of AI Research in 2013 while retaining his position of 
Professorship at New York University, and simultaneously starting a research partnership 
between Facebook and New York University’s Center for Data Science. He also convinced Mark 
Zuckerberg to let him run Facebook AI Research operations from New York City creating a 
dedicated lab there a few blocks from NYU in addition to the laboratories in Menlo Park CA and 
London. See https://www.facebook.com/yann.lecun/posts/10151728212367143 
28  Richard Waters, “AI academic warns on brain drain to tech groups”, Financial Times, November 
2016. https://www.ft.com/content/298e2ac0-b010-11e6-a37c-f4a01f1b0fa1 
29 The White House, Economic Report of the President 2016, Chapter 4.  
30  Research in the U.S. suggests that apprenticeship fetches a signifi cant premium at a given skill 
level—as much as $300,000 over a lifetime. Debbie Reed, et al. An Effectiveness Assessment 
and Cost-Benefi t Analysis of Registered Apprenticeship in 10 States. Mathematica Policy 
Research, 2012.  
But beyond that, education will need to change 
more profoundly and attract the required talent to 
develop and diffuse innovatively new pedagogies; 
including centered on emotional intelligence as 
well as tapping into the power of personalized 
learning and affective computing. Innovative 
public-private-partnership should also be explored 
to favor the emergence of the most effective 
learning environments and to incentivize good 
quality investment at scale. But policy-makers 
will probably retain a key role to ensure innovation 
diffusion to most, if not all.
As the “online-to-in-person” learning continuum 
grows more mature, the contours of teachers’ role 
are also very likely to evolve: from that of content 
providers towards that of content curators, 
educators, coaches and mentors able to guide 
learners along personalized path adapted to 
labor market needs. Crucially, civic education 
will also need to evolve to equip future citizens 
with data and AI literacy as well as adequate 
understanding of trends and stakes, including 
related to the governance of AI and other emerging 
technosciences. As we have seen in this study, 
the serious ethical and political choices abound 
regarding how societies will decide to collectively 
embrace the rise of AI. Forging consensus will 
not be easy, especially considering how the rise 
of income, wealth, geographic and opportunity 
disparities may unravel the social fabric both in 
developed and in emerging countries.
Will we succeed in making 
the AI revolution work for everyone? 
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